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Is the U.N. Becoming a Global Nanny?
The Case of Consumer Protection Guidelines

by Murray L. Weidenbaum

Without the American public realizing it,
the United Nations and other international
organizations are engaged in a massive expansion in government regulation of private
sector economic activity. To develop this
point, I would like to focus on one specific
example, the U.N.'s draft Guidelines for
Consumer Protection.
Mine is an unenviable task. How could
anyone possibly oppose guidelines that are
designed to protect the consumer? It takes
a hard heart to question the proposed
United Nations' promulgation of such good
things as product safety and purity, consumer education, and international cooperation.
Yet, sadly, when you push aside the verbiage customary in international position
papers, you quickly find that the "Draft
Guidelines for Consumer Protection," now
before the U.N.'s Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC), would flunk a truth-inlabeling test. Indeed, the so-called Guidelines have the makings of a blueprint for a
more centrally directed society than now
exists in any of the market-oriented
economies in the world. The fact is, these

Dr. Murray L. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center
for the Study of American Business at Washington
University in St. Louis. This report is based upon Dr.
Weidenbaum's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Washington, D.C., on May 19,
1983. Ronald J. Penoyer assisted in the underlying research for this statement.

Guidelines are a part of a growing movement to use the U.N. and othe1- international agencies to expand government control over the private sector.
When we look beyond the label, it is apparent that the Guidelines are a model of
vagueness and over-blown phraseology.
Grand and unusual goals are set forth in
sweeping language that is, at best, highly
generalized and unclear. Attempts to carry
out these Guidelines would surely result in
worldwide confusion.
In any event, the Guidelines likely would
interfere with the goal of open international
The Guidelines for C011swner Protection are
part of a growi11g movement to use the U.N.
to expand government control over the
private sector

trade by establishing a new set of non-tariff
barriers. Some parts of this code of conduct
would impose burdensome and costly controls on the world's economies-and would
tend to close, rather than open up, international markets. It is my belief that the
United States and many other nations would
be inviting disenchantment, as well as
substantial costs, if they were to adopt this
proposal. Above all, consumers themselves
would be hurt rather than protected.
In addition, the Guidelines show the
United Nations to be drifting further away
from its fundamental and crucial goal of
promoting and maintaining world peace. By
seeking to regulate the commerce and internal economic activities of its member nations, the U.N. is stepping into areas that are
properly left to individual countries.
Furthermore, the U.N. is diverting its limited
resources from its basic role of peacekeeper.
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Implications of the Guidelines
The Draft Guidelines for Consumer Protection contain, first of all, seven objectives
which are written "with special emphasis 011
the 11eeds of developi11g 11ations." The objectives are, almost necessarily, quite general in
nature. Several of them are particularly
problematic. For example, one objective is
"to facilitate production patterns geared to
meeting the most important needs of conswners." In economies organized along
private enterprise lines, the needs of consumers are always the strongest influence
on "production patterns"; the pressures of
the marketplace dictate that. But the Guidelines suggest the need for a controlled,
highly centralized economy in which consumer choices are in practice limited by the
decisions of an all-wise government. This
objective strongly implies that a central
government must identify, and then control,
the means of achieving the "most important
needs" of consumers. We need only consult
the dismal record of any of the world's
We need 011ly co11sult the dismal record of
a11y of the world's communist, centrally
plm111ed economies to know that the U.N.
Guidelines would severely hurt the
developi11g 11atio11s

communist, centrally planned economies in
feeding and meeting other essential needs of
their citizens to know that promulgating this
objective would severely hurt, rather than
help, the developing nations.
Moreover, this objective overlooks the
importance of world trade in meeting the
needs of consumers. More than ever before,
the more developed nations gear production
for international markets rather than for the
so-called "more important needs" of their
own consumers. The case of Japan is
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instructive. If its post-war economy had been
limited to meeting the needs of its own
population, it surely would not enjoy the
influence in world markets and the high
standard of living that it has today. The
same holds true for other market economies
mnging from West Germany to Hong Kong. '
Let me quote a second sweeping and illconceived objective of the Guidelines:
To curb business practices at the national
a11d international levels which adversely
affect consumers (including abuses of a
domi11ant position of market power by
private and public enterprises).

far-reaching nature. Here is an example:
To promote just, equitable and sustainable
eco11omic and social developme11t.

This is an imposing, high-minded ideal. But
who is going to define what is "just" and
"equitable" in any specific instance? Also,
who is going to decide-and then controlwhat is "sustainable" development? And
here is another "objective":
To establish stm1dards of ethical co11duct
for those engaged in production and
distribution of goods and services to
COI1SW11ers.

Surely we all deplore business abuses, but
how do we define business practices that
"adversely affect consumers"? And who
defines them? It is possible that a so-called
"adverse effect" in India or Zaire would
instead be a salutary effect for consumers in
the Caribbean or Colombia. Comparative effects make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carve in stone what is a "good"
product or service and what is "bad."
Moreover, nearly any product or business
practice may be arbitrarily labeled
"abusive" when it is held up against a
standard that cannot be achieved or which
consumers do not wish to pay for. Under the
proposed Guidelines, for example, Brand X
Soap might be held to "adversely affect"
consumers simply because it does not have
the "ideal" qualities of Brand Y Soap. And
where would this kind of thinking lead us?
In many ways, this objective is a Pandora's
box which, once opened, could be used to
limit the choices of consumers around the
world. It could even be used as a justification for erecting trade barriers, or strengthening barriers that already exist.
Other objectives in the Guidelines are
equally troubling when we consider their

Certainly, ethical conduct is laudatory. But
who will set the standards of "ethical conduct"? Who will place themselves above all
others and regulate private behavior? I
shudder to think how substantially a totalitarian interpretation of ethical conduct
would differ from that of a free society.
The draft Guidelines also contain a set of
general principles that governments are
called upon to follow "to develop or
strengthe11 their consumer protecti011
policies." These principles are written as
high-minded but vague and controversial
notions of consumer "rights" that governments are to insure. The list is impressive
and includes the right to:
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• "physical safety franz dangerous goods
cmd services"
• "ecmwmic safety from offe11ces or
malpractices" that deny benefits to
co11su me rs
• conswner informatiol1 and education
• "available and effective redress"
• form consumer groups and have these
groups' views represented in "the
decision-maki11g process"

At first blush, most of these principles or

"rights" seem to be admirable and worthy.
But even if some kind of consensus could be
reached on them, we must remember that
they do not materialize out of thin air.
Making them a reality is not automatic. In
each case, they imply a substantial expansion of the role of government, at least in
the economies now based on markets and
competition.
Furthermore, nowhere do the Guidelines
stipulate that there are costs attached to the
litany of benefits. A sense of balance between costs and benefits (and between costs
and effectiveness) is essential-especially in
less developed nations where resources are
so limited. The achievement of greater physical safety, for example, involves added costs
in producing or distributing a product, particularly if the goal is anything approaching
the idyllic "zero risk" notion embedded in
much existing consumer protection
legislation.
We have learned the lesson that government-mandated safety standards raise the

Govem111e11t-mandated safety stmulards raise
the price of products-and "price out" of
the market some of the most
vulnerable consumers
price of products-and, as a result, "price
out" of the market some of the most
vulnerable consumers (e.g., those with low
incomes). Ironically, such "pricing out" leads
to greater consumer risk. For example,
requiring a safer but more expensive ladder
than those now in common usage would
probably cause many people to climb on
chairs and tables instead-a much riskier
approach than using existing ladders, with
whatever shortcomings they possess.
Thus, product safety regulation can be an
imperfect and even self-defeating tool. More-
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over, individual beliefs of what is proper or
adequate safety protection are not absolute.
The world over, some people want more
safety in a product, while some people may
settle for less. In certain instances, people
require-or at least are willing to pay for-a
great deal of safety from a step-ladder or an
appliance or a tool; in other instances,
consumers do not.
Who, then, is going to decide what constitutes "physical safety," as set forth in these
Guidelines? Who is going to decide what are
"dangerous goods and services"? In terms of
number of injuries, few consumer products
can compete with the kitchen knife. Clearly,
the usefulness of many products leads each
of us to accept a reasonable amount of risk
in our daily lives-and that varies among
individuals.
Similarly, criticisms may be made about
the statement in the Guidelines of "the right
to such information as is 11ecessarv i11 order
to make informed choices." Trans~1itting
information about goods and services is a
worthy goal, if the information is useful and
accurate. But the task needs to be carefully
approached. Just take a look at the maze of
fine print that is often required on products
in this country-fine print which results
from the regulator's simple-minded notion
that more information is always better than
less. It is important to realize that market
economies reduce the need for specific product information. Producers of goods and
services know that they have a reputation at
stake in their brand names; it is in their
interest to maintain a high quality in what
they produce rather than to provide voluminous (and often unused) "information."
As for the "right to consumer education,"
the U.N. Guidelines show the same highhanded attitude toward educational systems
as they do toward economic systems.
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Consumers in less developed countries may,
in fact, need a great deal of education with
regard to products and services-but they
may need basic educational skills, such as
literacy, much more. As an educator, I am
naturally suspicious whenever outside interests attempt to dictate the contents of a
curriculum. The results are usually ineffective utilization of scarce educational
resources.
A questioning attitude also must be taken
Given the freque11cy with which people in
communist countries are thrown i11 jail for
"economic offenses" against the state, 011e
Guideline provision is potentially
very dangerous
with respect to the proposed "right to available and effective redress." Apart from
quibbling about a useful definition of what
constitutes "effective redress" at an international level, we would have to examine
whether a new claims court, or something
on that order, would duplicate or override
existing legal systems. That is just one
illustration among many of the dangers
inherent in using broad, sweeping language
in setting forth new policies at the international level.
One general principle in the Guidelines
raises grave concerns:
the right to ecmwmic safety from offenses
or malpractices which deny COI1swners
optimum benefit within their economic
resources.
Taken at face value, this is merely gibberish.
But given the frequency with which people
in communist countries are thrown in jail
for so-called "economic offenses" against the
state, this provision is potentially very
dangerous. Is "Big Brother" to determine
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what are "offenses and malpractices" and the
point at which consumers have derived
"optimum benefit" from resources? If this
so-called principle does anything, it shows
that the list of "rights" is a matter for each
nation to decide.
Further, the related principle that
"trw1s1wtio1wl corporati011s should co11fonn
to 11atimwl and intematimwl standards for
consumer protection" is not only vague in its
stated purpose, but blatantly discriminatory.
Why are "transnational corporations"
singled out for special attention, and not all
enterprises? I can only conclude that transnationals are focused upon in these
Guidelines as a scapegoat.
The one-sidedness of the Guidelines is
further indicated in the "right" of consumer
organizations "to be consulted and to have
their views represe11ted in the decisionmaking process." The Guidelines make no
provision for representing the views of the
very businesses that are regulated. In fact,
this U.N. document is not written from the
viewpoint of free-market societies: it speaks
of "the decisio11-making process," as though
only one can exist. That, I believe, is the
give-away. These Guidelines are not intended
for free market, private-enterprise economies; they are designed for a centralized,
planned economy in which the national
government makes the key economic
decisions.
Further Implications of the Guidelines
It is useful to list some of the specific
Guidelines and let them speak for themselves. Do any of these sound like regulatory
areas in which the United Nations should be
involved in at all?

It is the responsibility of the mwmfacturer
to ei1Sure that goods produced are ade-
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quately safe for intended a11d 110nnal use.
It is the respo11Sibility of the importer or
distributor to ensure that no U11Safe goods
are brought 011to the market . ...
Govemments should ... e11sure that the
il1lended level of safety is met . .. through
compliance with safety regulatioi1S,
national or i11temati01wl stw1dards, and
voluntary agreements, and by requiring the
maintenance of exact safety records.

The Guidelines are not meant for our kind of
economy. In our form of society, governments do not "ensure" safety or determine
an "intended" level of safety. Also, the
Guidelines ask governments to create paperwork mills "by requiring the maintenw1ce of
exact safety records." There is no indication
of having learned from experience in the
United States with agencies such as the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. OSHA has been cutting back its
paperwork requirements after learning that
so much of its initial, onerous recordkeeping
requirements were not needed.
If I want to buy something silly for my
wife's birthday, I could wind up violating
a U.N. policy

There are other provisions worthy of our
attention. Here are several Guidelines listed
under "protection of economic interest":
Government policies should seek to e11sure
that consumers obtai11 the maximum
be11efit from their economic resources.

Does not this describe the United Nations as
a global "nanny"? Extending this notion to
its "illogical conclusion," if I want to buy
something silly for my wife's birthday, I
could wind up violating a U.N. policy.
Here's another provision:
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Producers should ensure the availability of
reliable after-sales service.

From the standpoint of economics, this
Guideline is total nonsense. It also probably
runs afoul of our antitrust laws. Why presume that service must be provided by the
producer, unless a sale is a non-competitive,
tie-in sale? Production and service, after all,
are not necessarily provided best by the
same source-at least this is true in competitive, open markets. Moreover, is this properly a concern of the United Nations? In the
United States, we do not consider this an
area for government regulation at all.
The same criticisms apply to the following
Guideline:
Govemments should formulate and put
into effect national codes on marketing
and other business practices to ei1Sure that
such practices are fair to consumers. Conswner organizatioi1S should participate i11
the elaboration and monitoring of such
codes.

The demand for "national codes" such as
those mentioned here completely ignores the
fact that several member nations of the U.N.
have a federal form of government in which
the powers of the national government are
limited. Examples include the United States,
Australia, Canada, and West Germany.
Two other Guidelines in the category of
"protection of economic interests" again
cast the shadow of "Big Brother." One is the
following:
Governments should inte11Sify their efforts
to prevent economic offenses through systematically monitoring the adhere11ce to
the established laws and standards by producers, distributors w1d others i11volved in
the provision of goods and services.
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It goes on to state that consumer groups
"should be encouraged and supported in
monitoring economic offenses." What is the
true meaning and purpose of a provision
such as this one? What sort of government
systematically monitors the actions of private citizens? What sort of government encourages and supports specific private

The authors of the Guidelines have little
i11terest i11 either economic freedom or
perso1wl liberty

groups in monitoring other private groups,
as though they were licensed vigilantes? It is
obvious that the authors of the Guidelines
have little interest in either economic freedom or personal liberty.
Another suspect Guideline is the following:
Govemments should c011sider adopting a
specific policy for improvi11g the distributi011 system for essential consumer goods
and services, particularly in rural areas.

Why only rural areas? But beyond that,
what amount of choice does such a provision
allow for? Who is going to decide what are
the "essential" goods and services?
Guidelines Relating to Specific Industries
It is also helpful to examine the Guidelines
which have been proposed for specific industries. Here is one example:

Govemments, whe11 fonnulati11g national
policies and plans with regard to food production and distribution, should take into
accmmt the needs of all consumer groups.
Such policies m1d plans should i11ter alia
provide for adequate post-harvest handling,
storage, processi11g m1d distribution and
should include mechm1isms for appropriate
activity in the case of seasonal fluctuation
in food supply and prices.
12

Again, let us look at the true meaning of a
Guideline such as this one. How is a government going to take into account the needs of
"all" consumer groups unless, in fact, it
identifies and controls their "needs"? What
possible role could private enterprise play in
such a process? Certainly a very small one,
since carrying out the Guideline will inevitably require centralized planning. The same
applies to "adequate post-harvest handling,"
and so forth, since a central government
would have to direct those processes. But
perhaps the most disturbing part of this provision is the bureaucratic language about
"mechanisms for appropriate activity i11 the
case of seasonal fluctuation i11 food supply
and price." Plainly and simply, this means
price controls and export and import restraints. This Guideline is totally inconsistent with the workings of a modern, private
enterprise economy.
The Guidelines' disregard of the market
system is further displayed in two provisions
under national strategies "for food safety
and quality co11trol." One of these states:
Food co11taminatio11 m011itoring and C011trol programmes should be established or
strengthened ...

This Guideline gives absolutely no indication
that some countries have already done thisand done it quite well without the United
Nations. Instead, what we have here is a
simple-minded assertion and the belief, as always in these draft Guidelines, that more is
better than less-more regulation, more
intervention and control, more power in a
central government. Food standards-or "remedial actions" in the words of the Guideline-can be used by a nation to justify the
erection of barriers to international trade.
Finally, we see once again how the marketplace gets superseded in another section
13

concerning food:
Business practices affecti11g the processing
and distribution of food products andespecially the marketing of highly refined
and expensive food products should be
regulated in order to e1uure that such practices do 110t co11flict with consumers' interests or govemme111 aims in the area of
food policy.
Who is going to judge the so-called "conflict" between consumers' interests and business practices? In free societies with market
economies, if there is a "conflict," consumers protect their interests by not buying the
product. Resorting to regulation may simply
project "government aims" in food policyand that is probably the true purpose of this
provision. Moreover, why are "highly refined
and expensive food products" singled out
here? What all-wise power in a nation is
going to determine that a specific categm-y
of food products presents a "conflict" with
the interests of consumers, while another
category does not? When we recall that
meeting the safety and other standards will
increase the price of many products, it is apparent that this focus on expensive products
may be the closest thing to a perpetual motion machine guaranteed to result in even
more regulation.

regulation when it is doing such an inadequate job of carrying out the basic task for
which it was established.
It is sad to see the U.N. diverting its
attentio11 when it is doing such an
inadequate job of carrying out the basic
task for which it was established
Above all, its charter explicitly prohibits
the United Nations from intervening "in
matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state." Much of
the Consumer Protection Guidelines involves
just such intervention-and on a massive
scale.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, in this report I have attempted to make three main points: (1) the
U.N. Guidelines would impose centralized
control on the economies of sovereign nations, (2) the United Nations should focus instead on its fundamental role of peacekeeper, and (3) the U.N. should not assume
the role of global "nanny" and international
consumer "cop."

The Central Role of the U.N.
International regulation of the production
and distribution of goods and services via
these Guidelines is a far cry from the basic
role of the United Nations-which is, according to the U.N. charter, "to maintain international peace and security." That role
deserves the greatest amount of emphasis in
the dangerous world in which we live.
Frankly, it is sad to see the U.N. diverting its
attention to large-scale forms of economic
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